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Abstract— The continuing pervasion of our society with 
safety-critical cyber-physical systems not only demands for 
adequate (risk) analysis, testing and verification techniques, it 
also generates growing experience on their use, which can be 
considered as important as the tools themselves for their efficient 
use. This paper introduces workflow patterns to describe such 
best practices in a systematic way that efficiently represents this 
knowledge, and also provides a way to relate different patterns, 
making them easier to identify and use, and cover as wide a 
range of experiences as possible. The value of the approach is 
demonstrated using some pattern examples from a collection 
developed in the Artemis-project MBAT1. Finally, the paper 
presents a wiki-based approach for developing and maintaining 
the pattern collection.  
Keywords—best practices; description patterns; A&T patterns; 
combining (risk) analysis and test  
I. INTRODUCTION  
As advanced safety-critical cyber-physical systems (CPS), such 
as those in the European transport domain (automotive, rail, 
and aerospace), increasingly pervade our society and daily 
lives, it becomes ever more pertinent to asses and reduce the 
risk of their deployment.  At the same time, manufacturers are 
under a high pressure for delivering increasingly intelligent and 
feature rich products with short time-to-market, a high quality, 
and a low defect rate.  
Advanced dynamic and static verification and validation 
(V&V) techniques such as model-based testing and simulation, 
static code analysis (e.g., based on abstract interpretation), 
formal model-analysis (e.g., based on model-checking) used 
with integrated risk- and safety analysis can be used to target 
these challenges. Risk analysis is actually a crucial part of 
engineering and V&V of complex safety critical systems as 
                                                           
1 MBAT (Combined Model-based Analysis and Testing of Embed-
ded Systems) is a European industry led applied research project 
under Artemis Grant #269335, http://www.mbat-artemis.eu/home/, 
which partially funded this work 
risk can help prioritizing effort. Development of any complex 
product will the demand application of a multitude and mixture 
of these techniques, so it also becomes very important to know 
how these are to be methodologically used and combined, 
preferably in optimizing configurations, that reflects effective 
solutions and best practices.  
This paper proposes a method called analysis- and test patterns 
(A&T patterns) for describing typical and efficient workflow 
integrated risk and safety analysis, dynamic test and static 
analysis for V&V of CPS. By collecting, describing, and inter-
relating the A&T patterns there is a great potential for cap-
turing best practices and valuable experiences for advanced 
V&V solutions, and for communicating such ideas among 
researches and industrial engineers, with the ambition of 
advancing state-of the art in CPS and interoperable tooling.  
Fig. 1 depicts this overall idea of integrated risk analysis, test 
and analysis. 
 
Fig. 1 Overall analysis and test (combination) method 
Briefly stated, the engineers develop an initial V&V plan 
defining how and by what techniques each requirement for the 
considered component (and abstraction level) is addressed. 
This includes an initial risk2 assessment that will guide the 
required effort and choice of V&V techniques: Requirements 
and components with less risk call for use of less powerful and 
less demanding techniques; conversely with more critical 
requirements. Based on this initial plan, the engineers define 
and execute a number of analysis and test cases that results in a 
set of verdicts (pass, fail, inconclusive), measures of coverage, 
confidence, complexity etc., and possible indications of suspect 
behavior that require further investigation. These results are 
then systematically collected and fed back into the V&V 
planning activity, including re-assessment of risk, and are 
exploited to create a revised, optimized plan. This idea of 
combining different analysis and testing techniques can be used 
in several ways. For example, if a test reveals a defect, it may 
be worth the effort to target the problematic component with 
analysis due to the bug-clustering assumption. Similarly, if 
model analysis identifies a defect, it may be worthwhile to 
create additional test cases for that objective to increase 
confidence (and reduce risk) of the implementation. For the 
purpose of coverage-completion of a test suite with respect to a 
given test-criteria (e.g., branch or MC/DC coverage), 
insufficient coverage may be improved by utilizing a model-
checker (or static code-path synthesis tool [6]) to synthesize the 
test cases for the missing coverage items [1] by interpreting the 
counter example (or path condition) as a test case.  
Additional descriptions of the overall methodology are 
provided in [7]. However, this generic overall method may be 
used in several different settings. To make the solutions and 
concrete application more clear and usable, we developed an 
approach for defining workflow patterns that allows describing 
best practice solutions in a harmonized way, and which brings 
the individual workflows into relation with each other.   
After addressing related work, the paper introduces the princi-
ples of A&T patterns along with a systematic method for 
describing them. Two concrete examples of applying model-
based safety analysis (from a collection developed in the 
Artemis-project MBAT) demonstrate the value of the 
approach. This is followed by description of a wiki-based 
approach for presenting the A&T patterns catalogue developed 
in MBAT. The paper closes with a summary and outlook. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Based on earlier works in the domain of architecture [8], 
the concept of design patterns for software engineering became 
very popular, as they allowed describe working solutions for 
dedicated software development problems, in particular 
exploiting the new paradigm of object-orientation. The presu-
mably most popular book was [9], but a real massive 
publication activity occurred at that time, so that already in 
2000 a “Pattern Almanach” could be published with more than 
900 entries [12]. 
While software engineering is a central application field, 
the principle of solution patterns can be used in presumably 
any problem domain, since “A (solution) pattern is a (generic) 
solution for a certain problem in a given context” [13]. This 
                                                           
2 In this paper, risk is defined generically as the probability of 
occurrence of a failure times a metric of its severity.   
means it is not a fixed rule but a principal description or 
template for how to solve a problem. A good pattern defines 
best practice that can be re-used in many different situations. 
So, patterns have been described for a number of different 
domains, for example in education3 [2], organization4,5, or 
management6[10]. The related paper [11] presents a method for 
defining patterns and pattern evaluation criteria. 
For analysis and test, a number of pattern collections exist. 
But they deal with requirements analysis for deriving software 
design7 or with test automation, e.g. 8 and [4]. To our best 
knowledge, the combination of model-based analysis and test 
methods has not been described using pattern principles so far. 
III. A&T PATTERNS PRINCIPLES 
A. Sources and Scope 
The generic A&T methodology outlined in the introduction 
was applied in the project use cases, which consisted of a 
number of grouped tasks (called scenarios). It turned out that 
several processing steps taken to implement these tasks prove 
more successful than others, but also showed similarities, i.e. 
common work-flow patterns behind them. This motivated to 
develop a description technique that allows recording these 
experiences such that not only their reuse is fostered but also 
that as much as additional information is efficiently captured.  
B. A&T Pattern Items 
Several pattern notations have been proposed and used in 
literature, see section II for references. Given the observation 
that A&T patterns are essentially work-flows and that we 
wanted to collect additional information systematically, we 
chose following description items. 
Name: A good name is essential. It should tell the problem 
or context and indicate, if possible, the solution idea such that a 
reader can quickly guess whether a pattern can help for a given 
problem. 
Purpose: A concise description of the addressed problem, 
perhaps outlining the proposed solution approach. 
Context/Pre-conditions: Characterization of the situations 
where the pattern can be applied. 
To consider: Aspects to be considered when applying the 
pattern; they can help to decide about precise pattern 
application. Examples are required level of user knowledge or 
costs of involved tools. 
Structure: This is the core of the pattern. A&T patterns are 
workflows, and these are illustrated by workflow diagrams for 
which predefined graphical symbols are used, preferably based 
on standardized notations like Business Process Model and 
Notation (BPMN) or UML Activity Diagrams, that are 
                                                           
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pedagogical_patterns 
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organizational_patterns 
5 http://www.fearlesschangepatterns.com/ 
6 http://crinfo.univ-paris1.fr/EKD-CMMRoadMap/index.html 
7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_analysis_pattern 
8 http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/cc514239.aspx#CommonTestPatterns_topic2 
understandable by a wider audience and enable tool support. 
See section IV for examples.  
Participants: A description of entities used in the pattern 
and their roles. Examples are humans, tools, and data. 
Actions/Collaborations: A description of what active 
entities do and how entities used in the pattern interact with 
each other. 
Discussion: Further comments and possible consequences 
can also be described. This often includes practical application 
hints as well as potential limitations.  
Known uses: Examples how the pattern is applied in 
practice. 
Related Patterns:  A listing of other A&T patterns that com-
plement the described pattern or have other relationships to it. 
IV. A&T PATTERN EXAMPLES 
In this section, we give two examples of A&T patterns and 
their intention, using the notation introduced in Section III. 
A. MBSA with Fault Injection 
Purpose: Given the increasing complexity of safety-critical 
systems, it is more and more difficult to perform the safety 
assessment required by standards. The following pattern 
presents how to perform a so called Model-Based Safety Ana-
lysis (MBSA) [14]. Its results can be used for classical safety 
assessment techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and 
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA). 
The MBSA has two main prerequisites. The first is the use 
of formal semantics to express the analyzed malfunctions as 
well as safety requirements. This enables fault to be injected in 
the nominal system model and extending it to include the 
behavior in case of fault occurrences. Additionally, formal 
safety requirements can be translated into failure observers. 
The second prerequisite is the underlying verification technique 
that analyzes whether the failure of the safety requirement can 
be observed in the extended system model. A typical result of a 
traditional safety analysis, that can be generated by the MBSA, 
is the minimal cut-sets (MCS) for a given safety requirement. 
Cut-sets are sets of fault combinations that cause the safety 
requirement to fail. Specifically, if any fault is removed from a 
minimal cut-set, the remaining set is no longer a cut-set. 
To consider: Implementing this pattern requires the 
involvement of a safety engineer. Also, the execution of the 
MBSA might be fairly time and resources consuming. 
Structure: See Fig. 2. Dashed borders of activity boxes 
indicate substructure, which cannot be shown here due to space 
limitations. See the pattern wiki (section V) for more details. 
Actions/Collaborations:  
1. Formal requirements are created on the basis of natural-
language requirements. 
2. The system implementation model is created based on 
the formal requirements. Even if the workflow could 
start alternatively with natural language requirements, 
emphasis is put on formalized requirements to avoid the 
semantic ambiguity of natural language. 
3. Extending the nominal system model with malfunction 
behavior using fault injection techniques, resulting in an 
extended system model.  
4. A failure observer of the analyzed safety requirement(s) 
is generated. This observer automaton will be used later 
at the level of the analysis to monitor whether the 
system has reached a failure state. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Workflow of AT-pattern “MBSA with Fault Injection” (circled numbers refer to activities explained under 
Actions/Collaborations) 
5. A safety analysis task is created and linked to the 
extended model and the failure observer. 
6. The type of the safety analysis task is chosen, which can 
be either FMEA or FTA. 
7. The model-based safety analysis is executed. 
8. Finally, either a fault tree or an FMEA table is 
generated depending on the type of the analysis chosen.  
9. The safety engineer assesses the results and the 
outcomes for safety requirements violation (caused by 
the injected failure-modes). He can run a counter 
example (CEX) analysis to obtain a trace that shows 
how the faults lead to the violation of the requirement. 
10. The system engineer will modify the design according 
to the analysis results by introducing additional safety 
mechanisms. 
Comments: MCS can be used to automatically derive 
artifacts such as fault trees and FMEA tables. In some cases, 
the information contained in the generated safety artifacts is not 
trivial i.e. it is not clear how the occurrence of the malfunctions 
lead to the violation of the requirement. Accordingly, 
techniques such as model-checking can be used to generate a 
counter example (CEX) corresponding to a simulation run that 
clearly shows how the faults lead to a situation where the safety 
requirement is violated. 
Known Uses:  
The Model-Based Safety Analysis framework from OFFIS 
is an instantiation of this pattern. This framework comprises a 
set of tools, e.g., the OFFIS PatternEditor to formalize 
requirements, some internal tools to define the Failure Modes 
and the VV Cases, as well as the VIS model checker9 to 
perform the analysis. In order to make the tools more 
interoperable, e.g., use them in instantiations of other AT 
                                                           
9 http://vlsi.colorado.edu/~vis/ 
patterns, all of these tools are connected via an OSLC10 
compliant interface. Within the MBAT project, the MBSA 
successfully demonstrated the applicability of the approach to 
evaluate a prototypical Simulink/Stateflow implementation 
model of a turn indicator system. 
The overall setup and the application of the workflow of the 
pattern in the use-case are presented more in detail in [19].  
B. Support Safety Analysis by Fault Simulation 
After running the model-based safety analysis on an 
implementation model, a fault combination leading to a system 
failure is generated. This CEX is the starting point for this 
A&T pattern. The workflow is depicted in Fig. 3. 
The MBSA should normally be run again to assess whether 
the safety mechanism mitigates the given fault combination. 
Since the MBSA can be quite time costly to run, the pattern 
proposes to make use of the generated counter-example. The 
pattern suggests performing a simulation of the counter-
example generated by the MBSA on a system model injected 
with faults. Hence, if the modifications introduced to the 
system are not sufficient for reaching the safety goal, this can 
be discovered prior to running the MBSA another time. The 
workflow of the pattern is described in the following: 
Actions/Collaborations:  
1. The engineering models are created on the basis of 
natural language requirements. 
2. The MBSA workflow is performed and the outcomes 
of the analysis are generated. 
3. The safety engineer assesses the V&V Log for safety 
requirements violation (caused by the injected 
faulty/dysfunctional behavior). 
                                                           
10 http://open-services.net/ 
 
Fig. 3 Workflow of AT-pattern “Support Safety Analysis by Fault Simulation” (circled numbers refer to activities 
explained in pattern description) 
4. The system designer will modify the system according 
to the analysis results, e.g., by introducing new safety 
mechanisms. 
5. Faults are extracted from the counter-examples 
generated by the MBSA and are injected in the system 
model. 
6. A fault-simulation of the extended system model is 
performed. 
7. If the fault-simulation shows that the introduced chan-
ges are not effective and the top level event can still 
be triggered by the CEX, step 4 needs to be repeated. 
8.  The fault-simulation is performed again, if it results 
in a failure start from 7 again. Otherwise, the test is 
successful and the MBSA can be run on the updated 
system. 
V. THE A&T PATTERN CATALOGUE 
In order to establish and support a living quality assurance 
pattern community, we implemented a wiki-based approach for 
presenting the A&T pattern developed in MBAT. The pattern 
wiki [15] currently contains 16 patterns. It enables the quick 
and easy addition and modification of patterns including the 
support of editable diagrams for representing the solution 
workflows. 
Hosting of the web server and quality assurance of 
submissions is currently done by the leaders of the MBAT 
technology work package. Until now, the pattern wiki has 
helped to launch an active MBAT pattern community with a 
core set of contributing authors and a large readership within 
the project. Broader announcement of the resource for external 
interested parties has started. 
For our system, we use the MediaWiki platform [16]. The 
implementation of the MBAT pattern wiki consists of an 
overview page, which provides easy access to all pattern-
specific pages. Each pattern page contains links to related 
entities to facilitate navigation in the pattern set. 
One basic requirement for the technical implementation was 
quick and easy support for editable diagrams, especially for the 
pattern relationships in the overview figure and the concrete 
workflow descriptions in the pattern-specific pages. In the end, 
two types of diagrams are used: the pattern set and its relations 
(i.e. the “overview page”) is generated using a simple state 
machine diagram, and UML 2.x activity diagrams to describe 
the workflow diagrams in every pattern. Several libraries were 
evaluated. Considering the maturity and usability of the 
solutions, their integration into the MediaWiki system, and the 
ability to generate compact diagrams, PlantUML (for the 
workflow diagrams [17], which allows automated generation of 
these diagrams from textual representations) and GraphViz (for 
the overview diagram [18]) were selected. 
Fig. 4 shows a presentation of the MBAT pattern collection 
that serves as the main page in the wiki. The figure was created 
by the GraphViz library. Each pattern is represented as a node. 
The edges represent the connections and main relations 
between different patterns. Edge labels provide additional 
comments on the concrete relationships. The wiki pages of the 
single patterns are linked to the corresponding nodes in the 
overview figure via hyperlinks. 
Fig. 5 shows an example of such an automatically 
generated workflow diagram. The GraphViz library has some 
limitations with respect to our needs. For example, multiple 
activity labels or comments connected to arcs are not 
supported, and the empty diamond at bottom is needed to close 
branching. 
Till the current status of the MBAT project, the wiki has 
been a valuable source for getting in touch with the MBAT 
 
Fig. 4 MBAT A+T pattern system (pattern relationship diagram) 
patterns and quality assurance solutions. More detailed 
information on the pattern is provided by partner and case 
study specific documents. Public documents are linked to the 
pattern pages. For a more serious discussion, the corresponding 
experts and contact persons are listed. 
 
Fig. 5 Activity diagram of the ”Support Safety Analysis by 
Fault Simulation” workflow 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A. Summary 
This paper presents an approach for describing best 
practices on integrating (risk/safety) analysis and testing in a 
systematic manner by means of so called A&T patterns, which 
are developed in the Artemis-project MBAT. The approach is 
adapting the principle of solution patterns used widely for 
software engineering. An A&T pattern is a dedicated workflow 
for combining analysis and test steps for meeting complex 
requirements, improving efficiency, saving effort, etc. Besides 
the workflow diagram, the description of an A&T pattern 
contains additional information that not only helps to apply the 
pattern effectively, but also to quickly assess whether a certain 
pattern can help to solve or mitigate a certain problem. A few 
examples illustrate these concepts. 
A further significant benefit comes with the combination of 
A&T patterns. For that purpose, relationships between patterns 
are described, which can be illustrated in a pattern relationship 
diagram. Such a diagram is used as entry page for a public web 
presentation of the A&T patterns developed during the MBAT 
project. 
B. Outlook 
We envision two major directions of progressing work on 
the A&T patterns. One is extending the A&T patterns 
catalogue (by describing new patterns), which will also be 
guided by trying to fill gaps in the pattern collection where 
possible, and improving of existing descriptions. This includes 
identification of further pattern applications (known uses). 
The other is hosting and maintaining the public pattern wiki 
described in the previous section. This will include 
improvement of diagram presentations, for example to add 
activity and collaboration labels to workflow diagrams. 
It is hoped that the A&T patterns work started in MBAT 
will not only survive the project end, but also become a viable 
means for exchanging best practices in the V&V community. 
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